

~~SECRET~~
C 01366-84

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

FILE COPY

National Intelligence Council

SP - 38/84
1 March 1984
Copy 5


MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for
SCIENTIFIC and Technical Intelligence, DIA

25X1

FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

SUBJECT: NIE 11-12 and Technology Transfer

In the attached question and answer I have cited a number of judgments from NIE 11-12-83 regarding progress in Soviet R&D that refute the notion that we should sell the Soviets technology to lock them in second place. The breadth and depth of Soviet military technology programs suggest they will continue to derive tremendous benefit from greater access to Western technology.



Lawrence K. Gershwin

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

25X1

SECRET

SP - 38/84

SUBJECT: NIE 11-12 and Technology Transfer

Distribution:

- Cy 1 - Addressee
- 2 - Chm/NIC
- 3 - VChm/NIC (Waterman)
- 4 - VChm/NIC (Meyer)
- 5 - NIO/SP
- 6 - NIO/S&T
- 7 - DD/OSWR
- 8 - NIC Registry

25X1

NIO/SP (1Mar84)

25X1

SECRET

2

25X1

Question and Answer

NIE 11-12-83, Prospects for Soviet Military Technology and Research and Development states that the Soviet "practice of heavily adopting Western ideas and designs will continue to reinforce their position of technological inferiority to and dependence on the West." Doesn't this suggest that the US should use a strategy of encouraging the transfer of technology to the USSR to ensure that the Soviets continue to trail the US?

This statement must be read not just in the context of the constraints imposed on Soviet technical progress by following the Western lead, but in the larger context of the overall Soviet strategy for technical advancement. The statement reflects the fact that if the Soviets acquire technology from the West it will take time to absorb, copy, adapt and integrate into a weapon, and that in the Soviet weapon system development process, the technology level is frozen early in the process in order to insure program success. As a result, in that particular technology they will be somewhat behind the US, although they may in fact become much closer to us than if they relied on their indigenous efforts. They cannot surpass the US in any technology area where they rely on technology transfer. The judgments given below that are also made in NIE 11-12-83 deal with the broader context of Soviet R&D and strongly argue against selling technology to the USSR.

The Soviets well-organized national program for acquiring and assimilating Western technology has been a major factor in the advances they have made since the early 1970s in significant areas, including micro-electronics and computers, that are essential to the development of modern military systems. Incorporating Western technology into their military

SECRET

25X1

programs, rather than relying on Soviet indigenous capabilities, yields a significant savings in program costs, thereby freeing indigenous R&D resources for efforts in other areas, and takes less development time, thereby producing more capable military systems at an earlier date.

The Soviet weapon acquisition process helps compensate for some of their technological weaknesses. For example, their persistent modernization efforts have enabled them to move computer technology into deployed systems on the average of six years faster than the United States, enabling them to offset partially the US technological lead in computers. Similarly, frequent modernization of fielded weapon systems also helps the Soviets to offset the attendant technological lags that result from their reliance on Western technology for their military systems. It is thus quite possible that the Soviets could lag us in the level of technology available for a particular weapon system development, while leading us in the level of technology incorporated into a deployed weapon system.

We expect continued advancements in all Soviet military technologies, and that the present overall gap between the United States and the USSR of about five years will be further narrowed. A large number of the Soviet military technologies will be lagging by no more than two to three years--small enough to make the levels of technology nearly comparable for those military systems incorporating such technologies that will be introduced in the late 1990s and beyond.

In a general sense, the growth and maturity of the Soviets' R&D sector, in conjunction with the scale of their military programs, could result in some unexpected advances either in the speed with which they are able to develop and field new weapon systems with higher levels of performance, or in the novel design of some of their systems.

2
SECRET

25X1